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This paper is an initial exploration of the determinants of open source license choice.  It 
first enumerates the various considerations that should figure into the licensor’s choice of 
contractual terms, in particular highlighting how the decision is shaped not just by the 
preferences of the licensor itself, but also by that of the community of developers.  The 
paper then presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of license choice using the 
SourceForge database, a compilation of nearly 40,000 open source projects.  Projects 
geared toward end-users tend to have restrictive licenses, while those oriented toward 
developers are less likely to do so.  Projects that are designed to run on commercial 
operating systems and those geared towards the Internet are less likely to have restrictive 
licenses.  Finally, projects that are likely to be attractive to consumers—such as games—
are more likely to have restrictive licenses.  A more tentative conclusion based on a much 
smaller sample is that projects that involve software developed in a corporate setting are 
likely to have more restrictive licenses.  These findings are broadly consistent with 
theoretical predictions. 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive body of work has examined the economics of technology licensing.  
In particular, theoretical studies have intensely scrutinized several aspects of how profit-
maximizing firms should license their intellectual property, including the timing of the 
licensing transaction (i.e., whether before or after the discovery has been made), whether 
exclusive licenses should be employed, and the nature of the fees that should be charged 
(e.g., the tradeoff between royalties and flat fees).1 
 
But the question of the optimal scope of technology licenses has been much less 
thoroughly scrutinized.  More concretely, should the licensee be free to use the 
technology as he sees fit, being able to commercialize follow-on inventions, or should his 
use be narrowly circumscribed?  This paper examines this question in a special context: 
the licensing of open source software. 
 
The open source process—a method of software development in which 
contributors freely submit code to a project leader, who in turn makes the improved code 
widely available—is an interesting arena to start thinking about license scope because the 
standard considerations (e.g., timing, exclusivity, fee structure) are irrelevant.  Users of 
open source software must typically consent to a licensing arrangement, which may 
impose a variety of restrictions.  For instance, the user may be limited in his ability to 
                                                 
1Gallini and Wright [1990] and Katz and Shapiro [1986] are illustrative of this literature.    
Also relevant are those works that explore the real consequences of the licensing 
decision, whether the impact of this choice on subsequent innovations by the original 
innovator (Gandall and Rockett [1995]), the decision of rivals to enter the market (Gallini 
[1984]; Rockett [1990]), or the nature of the competitive dynamics in the industry 
(Shepard [1987]). 
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distribute a modified version of the program as a proprietary commercial product without 
releasing the underlying source code.2 
 
This paper first explores the various considerations that figure into the licensor’s 
decision of how restrictive a license to employ.  It highlights the complex set of 
motivations that may drive the choice of license.  It then suggests that permissive licenses 
will be more common in cases where projects have strong appeal to the community of 
open source contributors, and restrictive ones commonplace when the appeal is more 
fragile.  We suggest that projects geared towards developers may be more likely to fall 
into the former category, while those geared towards individual end users are more likely 
to fall into the latter.   
 
The paper then presents an empirical analysis of the prevalence of different types 
of open source licenses.  The analysis employs the SourceForge database, a compilation 
of nearly 40,000 open source projects that has hitherto been largely unexplored by 
academics.  We focus on two critical characteristics of these licenses: 
• Whether the license requires that when modified versions of the program are 
distributed, the source code must be made generally available.  Such a provision 
is sometimes referred to as a “copyleft” provision.  In the empirical analysis in 
this paper, we term such licenses as  “restrictive.”     
• Whether the license restricts modified versions of the program from mingling 
their source code with other software that does not employ such a license.  Such a 
                                                 
2Of course, the fact that timing, royalty rates, and exclusivity are not important in this 
setting means that our ability to draw lessons for the commercial world may be limited. 
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clause is sometimes termed a “reciprocal” or a “viral” provision.  For purposes of 
the empirical analysis in this paper, we term this a “highly restrictive” 
requirement. 
These licenses, it should be acknowledged, are complex legal documents that have not 
yet been tested in court.3  Significant ambiguities remain about their interpretation.  What 
is critical for our analysis, however, is the relative ordering of the restrictiveness of the 
agreements, not their absolute restrictiveness.  We will consider three classes of licenses: 
unrestrictive (for example, the BSD license), restrictive (e.g., LGPL), and highly 
restrictive (GPL).  (See below for a fuller discussion of these licenses.)   
 
The results are largely consistent with the framework above: more restrictive 
licenses are more common in projects geared towards end users and in such applications 
as games and desktop applications.  We explore the robustness of the results to the use of 
a variety of definitions of the independent variables.  In an exploratory analysis using a 
much smaller sample, we examine the licensing terms of projects that are spun-out of 
corporations.  The results are at least broadly consistent with theoretical suggestions. 
 
2. The Legal Foundations of Open Source Licensing 
Software developers have long been able to obtain copyright protection for their 
works.  When for-profit companies manufacture proprietary software products, these 
copyrighted works are typically licensed rather than sold.  By licensing the software, 
software manufacturers can limit their liability if the product does not work effectively, 
                                                 
3One decision that touched on, but did not resolve, these questions was Progress Software 
Corp. v. MySQL AB, 195 F.Supp.2d 328 (D. Mass 2002).   
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and restrict the rights that the users would normally have (e.g., the ability to 
simultaneously run the software on several computers).  (For a detailed rationale for this 
approach, see Neukom and Gomulkiewicz [1993].)   
 
In the early days of the computer software industry, however, much of the 
software was made available without an explicit license governing its use.4  (For a history 
of the open source movement, see Lerner and Tirole [2002] and the references cited 
therein).  By the early 1980s, programmers had become disturbed by instances of 
behavior that they deemed to be unethical.5   
 
In response to these events, MIT programmer Richard Stallman developed a new 
approach to distributing software in the mid-1980s.  Rather than dedicating the software 
to the public domain, he required users to license the code under the GNU Public 
License, or GPL.6  This license essentially required that the program’s source code (the 
underlying programming commands) must be freely available and that modifications to 
the code must be allowed.  One of Stallman’s major concerns, however, related to those 
who sought to commercialize modifications to the code.  He limited the ability of 
                                                 
4Subsequently, software was also made available under formal contracts between 
developers and users.  Later (in the personal computer era), software was protected 
through via mass market “shrink-wrap” licenses. 
 
5In some instances, firms had solicited contributions from third parties, and then sought 
to enforce intellectual property rights on software that resulted.  In other cases, 
individuals added a modest amount of new code to software that was distributed without 
restrictions, which they then sold as a copyrighted proprietary product. 
 
6GNU was the name of the project to develop a new operating system that Stallman had 
launched.  The license was later renamed the General Public License.  For a detailed 
history, see http://www.free-soft.org/gpl_history/ (accessed September 17, 2002). 
 
 5
software developers to undertake such activities in two critical ways: by insuring that any 
derivative works remain subject to the same license and by prohibiting the mixing of 
open and closed source software in any distributed works.  In this way, he limited the 
danger of commercial exploitation of these discoveries.  A variant of the GPL, known as 
the Lesser GPL, or the LGPL, allows greater flexibility in regard to the “mixing” 
requirement: in particular, programs are allowed to link with (or employ) other programs 
or routines that are not themselves available under an open source license.  In other 
respects, though, the LGPL is similar to the GPL. 
 
Meanwhile, several alternative licenses were introduced: 
• Perl, a UNIX-based programming language that allows for the automation of 
many system administration tasks, was originally made available by its founder, 
Larry Wall, under the GPL.  He soon decided that the terms were too restrictive, 
and developed what was termed the “Artistic License.”  With a few limitations, 
users were free to develop commercial products based on the Perl code.  Nor were 
any limitations placed on the mingling of proprietary and open source code.   
• Another variant was the family of BSD7-type licenses, which also allowed a great 
deal of flexibility to users, as long as credit was given to the University of 
California for the underlying code in the documentation of any derivative version.  
BSD-type licenses, which have been adopted by many projects (including the 
Apache web server), are today the most popular alternative license to the GPL and 
the LGPL.   
                                                 
7BSD stands for Berkeley Software Distribution.  The credit provision was dropped in 
later versions of the license. 
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• Another family of alternative licenses is those introduced by commercial 
companies that have “opened up” some of the proprietary code (i.e., made the 
source code available to open source programmers).  These programs have 
frequently added specialized provisions to address copyright and liability 
concerns of the corporate parent.   
 
In 1998, a variety of open source leaders came together to establish a consistent 
set of criteria for what constituted an open source license, which they termed the “Open 
Source Definition.”  Among the requirements for the license of a program to be 
considered “open source” were that: 
• The source code for the program must be available at little or no charge. 
• Redistribution of the program, in source code or other form, must be allowed 
without fee. 
• Distributions of modified software must be allowed without discrimination. 
• The distributions of those modifications on the same terms as the original 
program must be permitted. 
This definition was broad enough to both encompass the GPL and those licenses which 
allow users greater liberty in how they use the code.8 
 
Table 1 summarizes the leading open source licenses.  For each license that has 
been approved as falling under the “Open Source Definition” (as well as two other broad 
                                                 
8For detailed analyses of the Open Source Definition, see Lee [1999] and Perens [1999]. 
  
 7
classes of related licenses), we report, as discussed in the introduction, whether the 
license has what we term “restrictive” and “highly restrictive” features.9 
 
Despite uncertainties surrounding the enforceability of open source licenses,10 it is 
clear that software developers care critically about the choice of license used.  Decisions 
to switch between license types11—for instance, the WINE project’s recent move from 
the BSD-like X11 license to the LGPL license12—have proven intensely controversial.   
                                                 
9In some cases, those who redistribute the original code must make it freely available, but 
modifications need not be (e.g., the Artistic License).  These cases are coded as not being 
restrictive. 
 
10The extent to which these licenses can be enforced remains untested in a court of law.  
These issues are discussed, for instance, in Dodd and Martin [2000] and McGowan 
[2001]. 
 
11The alteration of open source licenses by project leaders poses several interesting 
issues.  Open source licenses differ somewhat from traditional licenses, such as the 
"shrink-wrap" agreements that govern the relationship between manufacturers and users 
of commercial software product, which require the consent of both parties to be 
effective.  Rather, an open source license is best seen as a conditioned permission to use 
one's property, akin to a landowner who allows hikers to use a path that passes through 
his property.  The project leaders can unilaterally change such permissions, just as the 
landowner could fence his property without consulting the hikers (or conversely, add to 
the network of trails).  Thus, the leaders of a BSD-license project would be free to switch 
to a GPL license, and vice versa.  Two complications, however, should be noted.  First, it 
is unlikely that open source project leaders can force existing licensees to honor 
alterations to the terms of licenses.  Thus, if a program had been made available under a 
BSD license and a firm has incorporated into the code into a commercial product, the 
project leaders in all probability cannot subsequently force the firm to make the product 
available under the GPL.  A second complication is introduced by projects where 
contributors do not assign the copyright for their holdings to a central entity (as the Free 
Software Foundation and many other sponsors of open source projects require).  In these 
cases, such as the Linux kernel development project, the copyright is in the hands of 
literally thousands of individual contributors.  Any change to the license would probably 
requite the assent of each copyright holder: any holdout could block the shift, unless his 
software contribution could be rewritten. 
 
12See, for instance, http://kt.zork.net/wine/wn20020308_117.html (accessed September 
17, 2002). 
 8
 
3. The Choice of License: Some Considerations 
A.  Some Tradeoffs 
Suppose that an individual or organization, whom we will term the “licensor,” 
wants to start an open source project.  The licensor may be a single developer, a group of 
developers with similar needs, or a corporation.  As a first step, some initial code is 
written or gathered, and then released under some license.  The choice of this license may 
be one of the key decisions of the overall design.  The license—along with the quality of 
the released code, the licensor’s reputation, and the demand for the product—will 
influence whether the project will appeal to programmers. 
 
To be certain, the choice of a license may be affected by considerations that either 
lie outside standard utility-maximizing paradigms, or may be distorted by a 
misunderstanding of the implications of the alternative licenses in the choice set.  
Examples of the latter are hard to document in view of the short history of the open 
source movement, and any guess as to the current existence of such mistaken impressions 
is necessarily subject to debate.  An example of the former is the influence of ideological 
views: to cite one example, the belief that “software should be free” is sometimes 
invoked in favor of the GPL license.13   Our primary interest, though, lies in assessing the 
extent to which the initial choice of license is a rational choice. 
 
                                                 
13This belief could conceivably be rationalized through its adherents’ confidence that 
future versions of the software will remain communal property.  For some adherents, 
though, this belief is simply a matter of principle.   
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It goes without saying that a license choice that is privately optimal from the point 
of view of the licensor may not be socially optimal. The choice of a license impacts: 
• The community of programmers who are asked to work on their project, as its 
benefits from working on the project may depend on the choice of license.14 
• The end users, who may for example care about possible incompatibilities among 
versions or about the number of available applications.  The choice of license, by 
affecting the likelihood of forking or the incentives of application developers, 
therefore impacts their welfare. 
• The other open source projects that later will compete with or complement the 
project. For example, a GPL program may prove of no use for another open 
source project licensed under a BSD license that could otherwise have made use 
of the program. 
• Commercial software vendors and support providers, whose opportunities are 
affected by the license. 
 
When selecting a license, the licensor assesses the various benefits that the open 
source project will bring her.  These include: 
• The intrinsic motivation that the intellectual challenge provides. 
• The signalling benefits (which encompass ego gratification and “career concerns” 
incentives such as future job offers and access to venture capital). 
• The need to solve concrete problems for one's employer.  
                                                 
14As we will later emphasize, the externality cannot be too large since the licensor must 
secure the participation of the community, but this does not imply that the preferences of 
the licensor and the community are perfectly aligned. 
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• The possibility of material benefits.   
 
For individuals, the latter includes the possible option of later building a 
commercial operation around the open source code.  This material incentive is distinct 
from the career concerns incentives mentioned above. It depends crucially on the 
commercial reward being associated with an addition to the initial open source project.  
By way of contrast, many of the signalling benefits arise even if the subsequent work of 
the programmer is unrelated to the open source project.  For corporations, material 
benefits include the increased profit on services or software that complements the open 
source software and the emancipation from the mark-ups and conditions imposed by a 
dominant software vendor with whom the open source project is meant to compete. 
 
This mixture of motivations implies that the licensors have a wide variety of 
goals.  For example, material benefits are paramount when licensors are corporations. 
Such benefits provide a smaller, but in a number of cases non-negligible, motivation in 
the case of individual licensors.  The licensor must assess how her mixture of 
motivations, together with project characteristics—such as the environment, the size of 
the initial code base, and the intended audience—impacts the following general 
considerations: 
 
1) Interaction of project with other software. 
As mentioned above, the open source project under consideration may not 
succeed on a stand-alone basis; rather, it may need complementary products in the open 
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source and/or commercial worlds.  The choice of license affects the ease with which the 
different pieces of software can be combined: a point frequently mentioned by advocates 
of the BSD license, who argue that the GPL and related licenses discourage potential 
commercial users. 
 
A case in point is the choice of license by programmers trying to get software 
established as a standard. Although they involve risks of hijacking (see below), 
unrestrictive licenses make more sense than restrictive ones in such a context.  This 
conjecture leads us to anticipate that projects geared toward the Internet, where standard 
setting has been particularly important in recent years due to the immaturity of key 
technologies, might be less likely to have highly restrictive licenses. 
 
Interestingly, the licensing choices may also give rise to “dynamic strategic 
complementarities” or “dynamic network externalities” among open source licensors. If 
existing projects in a field have restrictive licenses, the licensor is more likely to choose a 
restrictive license in the anticipation of future user benefits from combining the end 
results. Conversely, a project with a restrictive license may not flourish in an 
environment dominated by BSD-licensed projects.  The “greenfield” considerations 
discussed shortly thus need to be augmented by an analysis of “legacy aspects.”15 
                                                 
15An additional complication is introduced by the asymmetry of the licenses, especially 
the greater restrictions in the GPL license.  If a BSD-licensed project wanted to make 
substantial use of a program (or portion of a program) covered by the GPL, the project 
leaders would need to obtain permission from the copyright owner (for instance, the Free 
Software Foundation).  Were the leaders of the BSD-licensed program to incorporate the 
GPL code without permission, their BSD product would effectively be converted into a 
GPL product.   Thus, they will be reluctant to add such features.  GPL-licensed projects, 
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2) Hijacking. 
Advocates of restrictive licenses argue that unrestrictive ones are particularly 
prone to “hijacking” by commercial software vendors: in other words, the commercial 
firm may add some proprietary code to the open source software and take the whole 
private.  While the resulting software may (or may not) be superior, the firm disrupts the 
dynamics of the open source project by de facto privatizing it.  (The original project will 
not be privatized, but there is a risk that the proprietary derivative work will confuse, and 
perhaps dominate, the market.)  While such hijacking need not be socially detrimental—it 
may take the project to its next logical step or revive interest in an otherwise faltering 
technology—the action deprives the open source contributors of some of the benefits 
from the project.  (For example, they may have to pay for the final software and be 
unable to tailor it for their own needs.  One reason for this fear is that contributors to 
open source projects enjoy dynamic network effects—see our 2002 paper—and that these 
network effects may be reduced by competition from a proprietary variant.)  This 
prospect may discourage potential contributors in the first place. 
 
This argument for restrictive licenses could be rephrased as saying 
that community members make project-specific investments.  Hijacking poses the 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the other hand, can incorporate elements of (or work alongside) either GPL or BSD 
programs without subverting their license.  Thus, in settings where existing projects have 
restrictive licenses, founders of new projects may want to also have restrictive licenses in 
order to ease collaborations.  The pressures to choose a particular type of license may be 
less intense if existing projects have unrestrictive licenses.  More generally, the GPL can 
be seen as serving as an “absorbing state” in a way that the BSD license does not. 
 
 13
possibility that the members may be “held up”: for instance, they may lose the ability to 
shape the project to meet their particular needs and their contributions become less 
visible because the open source community loses interest in the project.  Several 
covenants in the restrictive licenses (including that about patent licensing discussed 
below) can be seen as a Williamsonian [1975, 1985] contractual response to address the 
danger of such “hold up” problem. 
 
To be certain, restrictive licenses are not immune to a problem akin to hijacking 
themselves.  After all, commercial software vendors can rewrite the open source code.  
(Copyright protection of software—unlike patent protection—only protects the 
expression, not the fundamental ideas.) 
 
In the end, the risk of hijacking under alternative licenses depends on the nature of 
the project. Open source projects that are conservative reimplementations of pre-existing 
software are probably less subject to hijacking than innovative software products.16 
Another potential determinant is the size of the code. Large projects are more costly to 
rewrite, and so costs and delay factors may make the choice of license more relevant in 
this case. 
 
3) Impact of software patents. 
Open source software proponents have often expressed concerns that patent 
infringement suits may hamper the projects.  It is easy to imagine circumstances under 
                                                 
16Bezroukov [2002] puts Linux in the former category, and scripting languages (TCL, 
Perl, Python, PHP) in the latter. 
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which software patents might affect the dynamics of the process.  Contributors to the 
software, as well as users and distributors of the code, may be deterred, especially 
corporations.  The GPL specifies that if some contribution is found to be infringing on a 
patent and the ability to distribute the code (or modification of the code) is thereby 
restricted, then the code cannot be distributed at all. This covenant is meant to prevent 
“joint hijacking” by the patent owner and an open source infringer who would then 
receive an exclusive license from the patent owner.  Historically, these provisions have 
not been included in any of the non-GPL contracts.  
 
4) Impact on incentives to produce complementary software. 
A standard argument in favor of unrestrictive licenses is that permissiveness is 
what it takes to attract commercial software developers to write applications that enhance 
the value of the open source code.   In particular, it has been suggested that in mature 
projects, when the energy of the initial contributors may be fading, the involvement of 
commercial contributors may be critical to success (Bezroukov [2002]).  (We will discuss 
license choices in cases where firms open up proprietary software below.)  
 
5) Familiarity of open source community with the license. 
There are benefits in the form of reduced transaction cost to the licensor who 
adopts a familiar license rather than an innovative but unfamiliar one.  Licensors 
choosing a well-known license economize on the learning costs incurred by the 
community as to how the license works and what its likely implications for the 
development process are. 
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6) Forking. 
Forking refers to an internal threat of competing groups moving in different 
directions and producing incompatible versions of the same initial open source project.  It 
is unclear to us how license type will affect the probability of forking or the effectiveness 
of the original project leader’s response; this topic may reward future research. 
 
B. Enlisting the Developers 
We now consider some of these issues more formally.  Consider a licensor (an 
individual, group of individuals, or a corporation) choosing among K different licenses, 
k=1,...,K.  License k confers expected payoffs or utilities kLU and 
k
CU  for the licensor and 
the (representative member of the) developer community, respectively.  
 
For example, these payoffs may take the following form (for i equal to L or C): 
π= + ,k k ki i iU B  
where  
k
iB  is the sum of the signalling benefit (peer recognition, career concerns) and the 
potential benefit of being able to tailor the code for one's specific usage ( kiB  
may also include the pleasure of working in a type-k open source environment), 
and 
π ki  is the expected commercial incentive.  For an individual, this would include the 
option of providing services or services based on the open source project, 
perhaps through a start-up.  For the corporate licensor, this would include the 
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option of privatizing the code later on, an increase in the sale of a 
complementary proprietary software due to the development of the open source 
project, or the reduction of the mark-up of another commercial software due to 
competitive pressure of the open source program. 
 
Letting CU  denote the opportunity cost of participating in the open source project 
of the (representative member of the) community,17 then the choice of license is governed 
by a constrained optimization.  All else being equal, the licensor would like to choose her 
preferred license, but must satisfy the open source community's participation constraint 
(CPC): 
{ }
max kLU
k
 
≥s.t. . ( )k CCU U CPC  
Furthermore, it must be the case that the resulting choice satisfy the “licensor's 
participation constraint” (LPC).  Let LU denote the payoff to the licensor of keeping the 
code private rather than releasing it under an open source license (the licensor may 
undertake the project as a proprietary project, or may just work on alternative projects). 
Then it must satisfy the constraint: 
≥ . ( )k LLU U LPC  
 
Let us for simplicity assume that there are only two types of licenses—restrictive 
(R) and permissive (P)—and make the following assumption: 
                                                 
17The member could alternatively work on other projects (commercial or open source). 
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If ≥ ,R PL LU U  then a fortiori ≥ .
R P
C CU U  
The motivation for the assumption that the project leadership (the licensor) is relatively 
more likely to benefit from a permissive license is that the ability to demonstrate talent to 
one's peers and/or to the labor market is not much affected by the choice of license.  But 
commercial benefits, which are probably larger under a permissive license, are likely to 
flow disproportionately to the project leaders: as Lerner and Tirole [2002] document, 
there are numerous examples where project leaders have parlayed participation in these 
projects into such opportunities.  Put another way, because the leadership of the project is 
likely to benefit more than community from a permissive license, if a restrictive license is 
better for the leadership then one can assume that such a license will also be better for the 
community.  Note that this assumption says nothing about absolute preferences. The 
leadership and the community may both prefer the restrictive license or both prefer the 
permissive license.18 
 
Ignoring for the moment the licensor's participation constraint, we can distinguish 
two cases: 
• Strong community appeal: The community will participate if the licensor wants to 
opt for the permissive license ( )≥ .P CCU U   In this case, the licensor chooses 
between the restrictive and permissive licenses in an unconstrained fashion. 
                                                 
18The logic behind this reasoning may be less compelling in the case where a corporation 
makes available proprietary software that it is already developed under an open source 
license.  We discuss this special case below. 
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• Fragile community appeal: The licensor will not obtain participation if she opts 
for the permissive license ( ).< ≤P RCC CU U U  Thus, the licensor must opt for the 
restrictive license, whether the latter is her unconstrained preferred choice or not. 
To illustrate the impact of community participation on licensing choice, suppose that the 
community of developers expects no financial reward from being able to commercialize 
complementary proprietary software or support ( )π π= = 0 .R PC C  Suppose further 
that their benefits from ego gratification, career concerns, and open source interactions 
satisfy the condition that: 
.< <P RC C CB U B  
This setting is depicted in Figure 1.  For convenience, the figure normalizes the licensor's 
benefits ( )RPkB kL ,=  to be equal to those of the community, although in practice they 
may differ (e.g., the leadership may get greater benefits).  The line S0 represents an 
indifference curve, denoting combinations of benefits that provide equal levels of 
satisfaction to the licensor.  If the choice is between points 1 and 2, the leadership prefers 
the restrictive license: the higher financial prospects from a permissive license are not 
sufficiently large to make it appealing to the licensor.  The restrictive license is then a 
Pareto choice to the extent that both parties prefer it.  By way of contrast, if the choice 
were between points 2 and 3, the licensor would prefer the permissive license, but instead 
chooses the restrictive one so as to enlist other programmers. 
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One application of this framework concerns projects with unsophisticated end 
users as the intended audience, such as desktop applications and games.  It is plausible to 
regard these as part of the “fragile community appeal” category: 
• Ego gratification and career concerns incentives do not have much power, as the 
audience mostly does not look at the code and is not composed of the 
programmers’ peers. 
• The benefits from tailoring the code for particular applications are weak. 
By way of contrast, code aimed at developers, and to a lesser extent, system 
administrators, is more likely to belong to the “strong community appeal” category.   This 
reasoning suggests that code aimed at developers is more likely to be licensed under a 
permissive license than code oriented towards unsophisticated end users.19 
 
One interesting question relates to the licenses chosen by corporations when they 
release code.  It might be thought at first glance that corporations would universally 
employ permissive licenses, since they wish to retain the right to commercially exploit 
discoveries.  But we should actually not be surprised if we see firms choosing more 
restrictive licences.  The very fact that the licensor could keep the code private (the 
licensor's participation constraint) implies that the act of releasing the code creates a 
“truncation effect.” Corporations release some pieces of code because their chance of 
winning the commercial battle against a rival has become small (say, due to technological 
differences or network externalities).  As a result, the corporation prefers gambling on a 
                                                 
19In the analysis below, we will equate certain licenses (denoted in Table 1) with the 
restrictive licenses discussed here.  This need not be the case for our analysis to hold: 
these licenses need only be perceived as more restrictive.  The latter assumption seems 
abundantly justified (e.g., Bezroukov [2002], Dodd and Martin [2000], Lee [1999]).    
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different strategy, such as selling consulting services or licensing the code on a case-by-
case basis to customers that for some reason cannot make use of the product if subject to 
a restrictive license.20  Such code may therefore belong to the fragile community appeal 
category, and thereby be more likely to receive a restrictive license. 
 
A related, but different, point is that the choice of initiating an open source project 
may be subject to an adverse selection problem if the community is less well informed 
than the licensor. The community may be suspicious about the project’s prospects (the 
licensor may have released the code because the commercial prospects were low) or 
about the licensor's intent (such as its commitment to the project rather than to 
commercially adjacent segments and the possibility that the firm will reprivatize the 
project).  This latter concern about reprivatization may induce the licensor to choose a 
restrictive license in order to “prove” her good faith.21   
 
4.  Constructing the Sample  
The dataset consisted of all software development projects listed on (and for a 
subset of the analyses, hosted on) SourceForge.net.  SourceForge is a free service that 
since 1999 has offered hosting and project administration tools to software development 
                                                 
20MySQL AB follows the latter strategy with its MySQL database.  The firm 
simultaneously sells its software and makes it available for free under the GPL.  Many 
large corporations prefer to purchase their product, both because of liability concerns (the 
GPL product is made available on an “as is” basis, while purchasers of the commercial 
product are fully indemnified) and worries about the GPL. 
 
21The case of Netscape’s Mozilla project, whose initial license was greeted with protests 
and was replaced by a more restrictive license, is one illustration (Hammerly, et al. 
[1999]).  
 
 21
projects.  The site’s operations have been funded since its inception by VA Software 
(formerly known as VA Linux), which at the time of the site’s creation was primarily 
selling computer systems optimized for Linux.  Today, VA Software has abandoned the 
hardware business, and intends to ultimately earn a profit by selling a version of the 
SourceForge service to corporations to manage the development of software for internal 
(proprietary) applications. 
 
SourceForge contained (as of May 2002, when the data was accessed) 
approximately 39 thousand projects.  Essentially, it accepts listings of (and is willing to 
host) all projects that conform to the Open Source Definition discussed above, as well as 
selected projects operating under licenses that are not compliant with that definition.22  
Not all open source projects, however, are hosted on SourceForge.  Many of the largest 
projects instead have their own web sites.  Other projects are hosted at smaller competing 
sites.  These tend, however, to be much smaller: Savannah, often referred to as 
SourceForge’s leading competitor, had 790 active projects in May 2002.23  Even when 
the projects are hosted elsewhere, however, these projects in many cases are often still 
listed in SourceForge (the reader is simply encouraged to go elsewhere to make a code 
contribution or report a bug).  In cases where a project was listed on SourceForge but 
hosted elsewhere, we are able to gather the basic data about the project, even if we cannot 
determine the extent of activity in the project. 
                                                 
22There are, however, exceptions.  These include, for instance, projects that involve 
encryption software that is banned under U.S. law.  For a fuller discussion, see 
http://sourceforge.net/docman/display_doc.php?docid=756&group_id=1 (accessed 
September 17, 2002). 
 
23http://savannah.gnu.org (accessed September 17, 2002). 
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We accessed the data in two forms: 
• The basic data about each project was downloaded from the SourceForge web 
site.  This information included the stage of development of the project, the 
environment in which the project operated (e.g., Windows-based systems, 
handheld devices, Internet applications), the type of license employed, the human 
language in which the programmers operated, the operating system under which 
the program ran, and the intended audience.  Since project leaders report these 
data to SourceForge, a natural question relates to their accuracy.  An important 
point to note, though, is that the project leaders are trying to recruit users to make 
an extended time commitment to their project.  Undertaking a “bait-and-switch” 
strategy at the time of recruiting new users—e.g., by making the project appear to 
be something other than what it really is—is unlikely to be a positive signal to 
prospective developers.  Only in approximately 40% of the cases, however, was 
the full information on the project (and especially the license type) available.  
This reflected the fact that project leaders did not always complete this 
information at the time the project was established on SourceForge. 
• We obtained directly from the SourceForge staff various supplemental measures, 
including the date at which the project was first posted on SourceForge and the 
activity at the web sites (e.g., bug reports submitted and resolved) since the 
inception of the site in 1999.  The latter data were available only for 
approximately 10 thousand projects.  In the other instances, the projects could 
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have attracted no activity whatsoever, or else the activity was concentrated on 
another site.24 
The two datasets were then merged.  The set of projects in the SourceForge database is 
summarized in final columns of Table 1 and Table 2.  In each case, we indicate the 
distribution for all licenses and for the subset of projects where the site has had active 
postings from SourceForge users.    
 
Several patterns are evident from these tabulations.  First, the dominant role of the 
General Public License is clear.  Fully 72% of the licenses are the GPL, and its less 
constraining cousin, the Lesser GPL, represents another 10%.  The BSD license, which 
represents 7% of the sample, is third.25  Second, the sample is dominated by early-stage 
projects.  This dominance is somewhat less pronounced in the tabulation of projects with 
contributions: not surprisingly, the youngest projects have garnered the fewest 
contributions to date.  Third, the sample is dominated by projects in English, oriented to 
end-users and developers, and geared to two families of operating systems (the POSIX 
                                                 
24Other concerns that might be raised about the performance measures are not borne out.  
Because of the extent of the coordination costs, even projects with multiple sites tend to 
have all (or virtually all) the contributions focused on a single one of those sites.  
Switching projects from SourceForge to another site appears very rare, in large part due 
to the “lock-in effects” that SourceForge enjoys.  See, for instance, the discussion in 
http://www.advogato.org/article/376.html (accessed September 17, 2002). 
 
25These tabulations are not weighted (i.e., each project is counted equally).  We do not 
have the count of the number of lines of code in the project, which might be a natural 
weighting.  We do have, however, the total number of problems (“bugs”) reported to the 
SourceForge depository.  While this measure is not as satisfactory (some projects operate 
code depositories that are not part of the SourceForge site, and thus appear to have little 
activity but are actually quite vital), it may nonetheless be a reasonable proxy.  The 
results of the weighted analysis suggests that the GPL license is not as dominant: 63% of 
the weighted projects have GPL licenses, 11% have Lesser GPL licenses, and 11% BSD 
licenses. 
